

Message Text

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ACTION EA-12

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EB-08 /138 W

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R 080944Z SEP 78
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1077
INFO USLO PEKING
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PEPR, SOPN, JA, CH, UR, US, KN, KS, VM
SUBJECT: TENG HSIAO-PING INTERVIEW WITH JAPANESE EDITORS

REF: PEKING 2803 (NOTAL)

1. FOLLOWING IS KYODO JAPANESE-LANGUAGE VERSION, AS
PUBLISHED IN SEPTEMBER 7 MAINICHI, OF TENG'S REMARKS TO
JAPANESE EDITORS ON SINO-SOVIET TREATY, SINO-U.S. NORMALIZA-
TION, VIETNAM, KOREA AND JOINT OIL EXPLORATION AND DEVELOP-
MENT. IT IS SOMEWHAT FULLER ACCOUNT THAN WAS CARRIED BY
ENGLISH-LANGUAGE KYODO.

2. QUOTE: SINO-SOVIET TREATY
WE STATED THIS CLEARLY TO THE JAPANESE SIDE, IN THE COURSE
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OF THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY.
WE INTEND TO ABROGATE THIS (TREATY). IT IS ONLY A MATTER
OF PROCEDURES, AND IN VIRTUAL SUBSTANCE, THAT TREATY HAS
CEASED TO EXIST A LONG TIME AGO. FROM THE STANDPOINT OF NOT
ATTACHING IMPORTANCE TO THE FORMULA FOR THE ABROGATION OF
THE TREATY, THE GOVERNMENT MAY NOT TAKE OFFICIAL MEASURES.
HOWEVER, WOULD IT NOT BE ALL RIGHT TO MAKE A DECLARATION IN

A LIGHT FORM, USING THE NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY?

(TO THE QUESTION ASKING: WOULD THAT MAKE IT OFFICIAL?) IF THE NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY WERE TO SAY THAT IT IS BEING DECLARED UPON ORDERS RECEIVED, I THINK EVERYONE WILL UNDERSTAND.

PROBLEM OF SINO-U.S. NORMALIZATION

OUR POSITION (TOWARD NORMALIZATION) IS CLEAR. WE ARE NOTING WITH ATTENTION THAT THE U.S. IS TAKING A SLIGHTLY MORE POSITIVE ATTITUDE (TOWARD NORMALIZATION) THAN IN THE PAST. HOWEVER, IT IS DIFFICULT TO SAY WHEN IT WILL BE.

THE SOLE OBSTACLE (FOR SINO-U.S. NORMALIZATION) IS THE TAIWAN PROBLEM. WE ARE REQUESTING OF THE U.S. (1) THE ABROGATION OF THE U.S.-TAIWAN MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY, (2) THE WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES, AND (3) SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. THERE ARE TWO KINDS OF PUBLIC OPINION WITHIN THE U.S. ONE IS THAT "IT IS ALL RIGHT TO GIVE CONSIDERATION TO CHINA'S REQUEST," AND THE OTHER IS THAT "WE SHOULD NOT DISCARD AN OLD FRIEND (TAIWAN)."

WE THINK THAT IT WOULD BE GOOD TO TAKE THE "JAPANESE FORMULA." THE U.S. SIDE HAS PROPOSED VARIOUS FORMULAS TO US, SUCH AS THE "REVERSE LIAISON OFFICE FORMULA" (THE UNCLASSIFIED

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ESTABLISHING OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN PEKING, AND THE ESTABLISHING OF ITS LIAISON OFFICE IN TAIPEI), BUT WE TURNED THEM DOWN BECAUSE THEY WERE ALL EITHER "TWO CHINAS" OR "ONE-AND-A-HALF CHINAS."

HOWEVER, WE HAVE BEEN SAYING THAT WHEN THE U.S. SIDE SETTLES THE TAIWAN PROBLEM, "WE WILL UNDERSTAND THE REALITY OF TAIWAN, AND WE WILL TAKE A PROPER METHOD." I SAID TO AN AMERICAN DELEGATION WHICH VISITED CHINA SOME TIME AGO THAT "IF CHINA SHOULDERS THE OBLIGATION THAT IT WILL NOT RESORT TO ARMED LIBERATION, THAT WILL BECOME A BIG OBSTACLE TO THE UNIFICATION OF THE FATHERLAND." IF WE SHOULD SUCH AN OBLIGATION, IT WILL BECOME IMPOSSIBLE EVEN TO HOLD TALKS ON A PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF THE FATHERLAND. I WANT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO GIVE THOUGHT TO THIS POINT.

RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM:

(TO THE QUESTION ASKING: DID NOT CHINA'S DISCONTINUING ITS ECONOMIC AID RESULT IN DRIVING VIETNAM TO THE SOVIET SIDE?) IT DID NOT DRIVE VIETNAM TO THE SOVIET SIDE AS A RESULT. (VIETNAM) HAD JOINED THE SOVIET CAMP A LONG TIME AGO.

I SAID TO SOME JAPANESE FRIENDS RECENTLY THAT "YOU ARE TRYING TO MAKE VIETNAM YOUR ALLY, WITH 10 BILLION YEN. HOWEVER, WE WERE UNABLE TO MAKE VIETNAM OUR ALLY, EVEN THOUGH WE USED 10 BILLION DOLLARS, OR AT THE CURRENT VALUE, 20 BILLION DOLLARS."

THE SOVIET UNION SAYS THAT IT IS NOT DEMANDING THE CREATION OF BASES IN VIETNAM, AND VIETNAM IS ALSO SAYING THAT THE CREATION OF BASES WILL NOT BE PERMITTED. THIS, HOWEVER, IS NOT TRUE. THERE IS NO NEED TO ESTABLISH NEW BASES IN VIETNAM. DURING THE WAR, THE U.S. CREATED BASES, AND THERE ARE NAVAL PORTS AND AIRPORTS AT SEVERAL TENS OF

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PLACES. THE REMAINING PROBLEM IS TO USE THEM.

(CONCERNING JAPAN'S ECONOMIC AID TO VIETNAM) IT IS A WASTE OF MONEY. OF COURSE, IF YOU WANT TO WASTE MONEY, THAT IS ALL RIGHT.

IS IT NOT BETTER TO LET THE SOVIET UNION ALONE BEAR THE ECONOMIC BURDEN OF VIETNAM? THE SOVIET UNION IS SENDING

MILITARY MATERIALS, BUT IT IS NOT IN A SITUATION WHERE IT CAN SUPPLY DAILY NECESSITIES FULLY. FOR THIS REASON, IT HAD VIETNAM JOIN COMECON, AND IS HAVING THE MEMBER NATIONS SHOULDER THE ECONOMIC BURDEN. STILL FURTHER, IT IS INSTIGATING (VIETNAM) TO RECEIVE ASSISTANCE FROM THE U.S., EUROPE AND JAPAN.

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OUR COUNTRY WILL NOT CO-OPERATE (WITH VIETNAM). THAT IS BECAUSE IT WILL MEAN CO-OPERATING WITH THE SOVIET UNION. WHETHER JAPAN WILL DO SO OR NOT IS A MATTER TO BE CONSIDERED BY JAPAN.

(TO THE QUESTION POINTING OUT THAT IT SEEMS THAT SINO-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS RESEMBLE THE SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS IN THE PAST) DO YOU PEOPLE KNOW ABOUT SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS? THOUGH CALLED AID TO CHINA, IT WAS LOANS, CALCULATED AT INTERNATIONAL PRICES. THE ONLY DIFFERENCE WAS THAT THE INTEREST RATE WAS LOW. IN JUST ONE NIGHT, IT ABROGATED SEVERAL HUNDRED AID AGREEMENTS, AND IN JUST ONE NIGHT, IT WITHDREW ITS TECHNICIANS. IN THE DAYS OF KHRUSHCHEV, IT TOLD US TO REPAY THE LOANS.

MOST OF OUR AID TO VIETNAM WAS GIVEN FREE. OF OUR AID AMOUNTING TO 20 BILLION DOLLARS, ONLY A LITTLE OVER ONE BILLION DOLLARS WAS LOW-INTEREST LOANS. WE HAVE ALSO NOT ASKED IT TO REPAY THE LOANS.

(TO THE QUESTION ASKING: WILL VIETNAM EXPAND ITS WAR WITH CAMBODIA?) IT IS HARD TO MAKE PREDICTIONS. IF THE SCALE EXPANDS, IT WILL START (WAR) AGAINST CHINA.
PROBLEM OF KOREAN UNIFICATION:

AS WE VIEW IT, WE DO NOT THINK THAT THERE IS ANY GREAT TENSION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. CHINA HAS CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTED CHAIRMAN KIM IL SUNG'S PEACEFUL AND AUTONOMOUS UNIFICATION. IN THE CASE OF A NATION BEING DIVIDED INTO TWO, THE PROBLEM MUST BE SETTLED, SOONER OR LATER. IT IS THE SAME FOR THE TWO CHINAS, AND JAPAN ALSO HAS THE PROBLEM OF "ONE JAPAN" AND "ONE-ONE-HUNDREDTH JAPAN" (THE NORTHERN TERRITORY).

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I BELIEVE THAT THE UNIFICATION OF KOREA WILL BE REALIZED

EVENTUALLY, IF NOT IN TEN YEARS, THEN IN ONE HUNDRED YEARS.

THERE IS A LIMIT TO SOVIET INFLUENCE TOWARD THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (NORTH KOREA). THE POINT TO BE NOTED WITH ATTENTION IS NOT THAT SOVIET INFLUENCE HAS INCREASED OVER THE "NORTH," BUT THAT IT IS EXTENDING ITS INFLUENCE TO THE "SOUTH" (THE ROK). HOWEVER, THE SCOPE OF WHAT THE SOVIET UNION CAN DO IS LIMITED. SOME PEOPLE IN JAPAN SEEM TO BE THINKING THAT THINGS ARE GOING WELL FOR THE SOVIET UNION. WE, HOWEVER, DO NOT THINK SO.

OIL:

(TO THE QUESTION ASKING: THE KEY TO THE EXPANSION OF JAPAN-CHINA TRADE IS CHINESE CRUDE OIL. DO YOU INTEND TO INCREASE CRUDE OIL EXPORTS TO JAPAN, BEYOND THE TARGET AMOUNT OF 15 MILLION TONS IN 1982, SET FORTH IN THE LONG-TERM AGREEMENT?) THAT IS OUR INTENTION. WE CHECKED OUR RESOURCES, AND THEY ARE FAIRLY ABUNDANT. THEREFORE, WE INTEND TO SPEED UP THE PACE OF DEVELOPMENT. I THINK THAT THE PROBLEM OF HEAVY QUALITY OIL CAN BE SOLVED BY JAPAN'S TECHNOLOGY.

(TO THE QUESTION ASKING: IT IS POSSIBLE, TECHNOLOGICALLY. HOWEVER, HUGE AMOUNTS OF INVESTMENTS ARE NEEDED FOR CRACKING FACILITIES. THEREFORE, WILL IT NOT BE NECESSARY FOR THE CHINESE SIDE TO LOWER THE PRICE, IN ORDER TO EXPORT LARGE AMOUNTS?) LET US LEAVE THIS PROBLEM TO CONCRETE STUDIES BY PERSONS CONCERNED ON BOTH SIDES. THIS IS A PROBLEM WHICH HAS INTERNATIONAL CONNECTIONS, AND WE DO NOT WANT TO ACT IN A WAY WHICH WILL INJURE OTHER OIL-EXPORTING NATIONS. JAPAN USES 300 MILLION TONS OF OIL A YEAR. EVEN IF IT WERE TO IMPORT 40 OR 50 MILLION TONS A YEAR, THE PERCENTAGE IS SMALL. AS FOR PRICES, THE INTERNATIONAL

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MARKET PRICES MUST BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION.
(TO THE QUESTION ASKING: BY AROUND WHEN DO YOU THINK THAT
YOU CAN EXPORT 40 TO 50 MILLION TONS?) IT WILL BE DECIDED
AFTER SEEING THE DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA. WE ARE TRYING TO
SPEED UP THE PACE OF DEVELOPMENT, BY BRINGING IN THE
TECHNOLOGY OF THE ADVANCED NATIONS. JAPAN CAN PARTICIPATE
IN FUTURE DEVELOPMENT, ESPECIALLY IN DEVELOPMENT ON THE
SEAS. RECENTLY, WE CONCLUDED AN AGREEMENT WITH THE U.S.,
AND IT WILL CO-OPERATE IN DEVELOPMENT ON THE SEAS. CHINA
HAS NOT A FEW SEA-BED OIL FIELDS. WE CAN CONSIDER AN
AGREEMENT WITH JAPAN WHICH IS THE SAME AS THAT WITH THE
U.S. THE HOLDING OF TALKS BETWEEN THE SECTORS CONCERNED
IS BEING CONSIDERED.

3. COMPLETE KYODO TEXT OF INTERVIEW WILL BE POUCHED TO
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DEPARTMENT, USLO AND HONG KONG. MANSFIELD

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